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| Γερμανοί αξιωματικοί στη Βεύη |
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The Break-Through to Kozani
By the morning of 10 April the XL Panzer Corps had finished its
preparations for the continuation of the offensive. A reconnaissance
battalion of the SS regiment that had been sent ahead did not encounter any
strong opposition until it reached the area east of Florina. Against all
expectations, the enemy had left open the Monastir Gap. The Germans did not
hesitate to exploit their advantage and continued the advance in the
direction of Kozani.
First contact with British troops was made north of Vevi at 11:00 on 10
April. An intercepted radio message indicated that the British command was
surprised by the swiftness of the SS regiment's thrust and gave orders for
immediate withdrawal from the Vermion Position. The SS troops seized Vevi
on 11 April, but were stopped a short distance south of that town, where
strong Australian forces held the dominating heights overlooking the pass
road. During the next day the SS regiment reconnoitered the enemy positions
and at dusk launched a frontal attack against the pass. After heavy
fighting the Germans overcame the enemy resistance and broke through the
defile.
On 13 April the XL Panzer Corps commander ordered mobile elements of the
9th Panzer Division to pursue the withdrawing British forces to Kozani and
cut off their communications with Verroia, situated along the southeastern
foothills of the Vermion Range. The SS regiment was given the mission of
cutting off the Greek First Army's route of withdrawal from Albania by
driving westward and taking possession of the Kastoria area.
During the early afternoon of 13 April the 33d Panzer Regiment of the 9th
Panzer Division entered Ptolemais, a town midway between Vevi and Kozani.
The arrival of the German forces was greeted by heavy shelling from the
hills south and southeast of the town. German reconnaissance patrols
reported that the road bridge situated about 500 yards south of Ptolemais
had been blown up by the British and that a ditch filled with water cut
across the low ground on both sides of the road. The ditch was six feet
wide and three feet deep and had soft shoulders. It constituted a perfect
antitank obstacle. The patrols came under heavy fire from artillery,
antitank, and machine guns emplaced on the high ground overlooking the road.
The regimental commander sent out two patrols to find a road that bypassed
the ditch. Two side roads were discovered, one of which was impassable for
armored vehicles since a bridge leading across the river had been
demolished and steep dams dominated both banks. The other road bypassing
the ditch to the west led through a swamp interspersed with several ditches
but seemed passable even though there was no trace of recent vehicular
traffic. Most of this road-stretch across the swamp was in plain view of
the British.
The regimental commander chose the latter route for his axis of advance
because it offered a possibility to envelop the enemy's dominating
positions and strike his flank. The approach across the swamp was very
difficult and had to be made at a walking pace under intermittent fire from
British tanks and antitank guns. As soon as the first German tanks came
within striking distance, they opened fire and drove off the enemy
vehicles, knocking out two of them.
After having crossed the swamp the German armor deployed. Seven tanks were
stuck and followed later. Speed was of the essence if the plan of attack
was to succeed and the enemy was to be prevented from withdrawing. This
part of the plan was complicated by the difficult terrain which rose
abruptly and was broken in places. At the same time the British stepped up
their artillery and antitank fire. As dusk was setting in, the German tanks
assembled and suddenly emerged on the British flank with all guns ablaze.
The British tanks turned about and a violent engagement developed, the
result of which could not be accurately gauged because of growing darkness.
Two British self-propelled antitank guns were engaged at less than 200
yards' distance, while trying to escape. They were knocked out and a few
supply trucks were captured. Some of the British tanks set up smoke screens
to further reduce visibility and thus cover their withdrawal. As darkness
covered the battlefield the Germans observed explosions in the distance and
noticed that the enemy artillery fire was decreasing.
The plan to push on to Kozani had to be abandoned because the German tanks
had expended almost all their ammunition. Some tanks had no gasoline left,
while the rest had only enough for about ten miles. The British had lost
their hill positions, abandoning thirty-two tanks and antitank guns as well
as a number of trucks. The Germans lost 2 Mark IV, 1 Mark II, and 1 Mark I
tanks in the engagement. This was the first and last tank battle that took
place during the Greek campaign.
By the morning of 14 April the spearheads of the 9th Panzer Division
reached Kozani. That same evening the division established a bridgehead
across the Aliakmon River, but an attempt to advance beyond this point was
stopped by intense enemy fire. For the next three days the 9th Panzer
Division advance was stalled in front of the strongly fortified mountain
positions held by the British.
The Withdrawal of the Greek First Army
The position of the Greek First Army, still fighting in Albania, was
seriously jeopardized by the rapid advance of the XL Panzer Corps via
Florina and by the British withdrawal to positions behind the Aliakmon. The
Greek command therefore had to come to grips with the necessity of
withdrawing southward from Albania. However, it was not until 13 April that
the first Greek elements began to withdraw toward the Pindus Mountains. On
the next day an advance detachment of the 73d Infantry Division encountered
Greek troops withdrawing from Albania across the Pindus Mountains into the
area west of Kastoria. Heavy fighting took place on that and the following
day, especially at Kastoria Pass, where the Germans blocked the Greek
withdrawal, which by then extended to the entire Albanian front, with the
Italians in hesitant pursuit.
On 19 April the 1st SS Regiment which had meanwhile reached Grevena was
ordered to advance southeastward in the direction of Yannina to cut off the
Greeks' route of withdrawal to the south and complete their encirclement.
This mission was accomplished by 20 April, following a pitched battle in
the 5,000 foot high Metsovon Pass in the Pindus Mountains. Realizing the
hopelessness of the situation, the Greek commander offered to surrender his
army, which then consisted of fourteen divisions. After brief negotiations,
which, on strict orders from Hitler, were kept secret from the Italians,
the surrender was accepted with honorable terms for the defeated. In
recognition of the valor with which the Greek troops had fought, their
officers were permitted to retain their side arms. The soldiers were not
treated as prisoners of war and were allowed to go home after the
demobilization of their units.
For reasons of prestige Mussolini insisted that the Greeks also surrender
to the Italians. Hostilities between the Greeks and Italians continued for
two more days, and on 23 April the Greek commander signed a new surrender
agreement which included the Italians.
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